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Pension Reform:
Lessons From Latin America
Monika Queisser*
Abstract
* There are benefits from Latin American pension reform, but they have
been overestimated.
* The approaches taken in second-generation reforms and their still early
results hold lessons for OECD and non-OECD countries alike.
* A partial shift to funding is feasible and can be financed in different
ways; partial funding of pensions can lead to greater risk diversifica-
tion.
* High administrative costs and uniformity of investment portfolios
make the new systems inefficient; pension regulation has to be designed
and implemented to lessen these negative effects.
I. Introduction.
Pension reform is high on the agendas of countries around the world. More and
more Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries are
looking for solutions to deal with increasing demographic pressures by putting pension
financing on a financially sustainable track to maintain prosperity in ageing societies.I
Containment of pension spending and the reduction of high contribution rates are also
urgent issues for transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe. In the developing
countries of Asia, where pension systems are much more limited in size and scope, the
financial crisis has painfully demonstrated the problems of weak financial systems cou-
pled with the absence of social safety nets; this situation makes the Latin American
attempt to improve old age security, while simultaneously fostering financial sector devel-
opment, particularly relevant for Asia. This article will examine the early experience of
the Latin American pension reforms and discuss their implications for the reform discus-
sion in other parts of the world.
Senior Economist, OECD, Paris. The views expressed are those of the author and not necessar-
ily of the OECD. This article is based on OECDE Policy Brief No. 15 on Pension Reforms, as
prepared by Dr. Queisser. Dr. Queisser is the author of The Second-generation Pension Reforms
in Latin America, OECD Development Centre Study, Paris.
1. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., MAINTAINING PROSPERITY IN AN AGEING SOCIETY
(1998).
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II. Latin America Pension Reform - In General.
A. LEADING GLOBAL REFORM.
Latin America has proven to be the most dynamic and innovative region in the area
of pension reform. The pioneer in pension reform was Chile, which introduced radical
changes as early as 1981 with its revolutionary move from a public pay-as-you-go system
to a fully funded, privately managed pension scheme. The role of the state has been
reduced from directly providing old age security to regulating, supervising, and, to a cer-
tain extent, guaranteeing the provision of old age security by the private sector.
More than a decade after the Chilean reform, seven other countries in Latin
America-Peru, Colombia, Argentina, Uruguay, Mexico, Bolivia, and El Salvador-have
reformed their pension systems. No two of these "second-generation" pension reforms
are alike, but they share the common feature of a greater role for funded, privately man-
aged pensions.
The experience of the Chilean and the second-generation reform countries holds
important policy lessons for OECD and non-OECD countries alike. This article will
explain:
* why the Latin American countries moved earlier than other regions to
reform their pension systems;
* what the new pension models look like and why the countries chose
these models;
* which policies governments used to manage the transition from the old
to the new systems;
* which reforms were successful and where improvements are needed;
and
* what OECD and other countries can learn from the Latin American
experience.
The brief will examine in more detail whether the new systems are living up to the
reformers' expectations, i.e., whether they are able to provide better and cheaper pensions
than the old systems. Also, it will discuss whether using the market is an efficient and
effective policy for providing lifelong retirement income security.
B. WHAT WENT WRONG WITH THE OLD PENSION SYSTEMS?
The first Latin American pension systems were set up in the 1920s, making Latin
America the first region outside Europe to adopt earnings-related social insurance
schemes. The oldest systems are found in Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay. In the latter two
countries, the age profiles of the population are comparable to those of Western Europe
and population growth is low or even negative. Thus, by the 1990s, their pay-as-you-go
systems had reached high degrees of maturity and were already struggling with the prob-
lems witnessed in many OECD countries today, i.e., rising pension expenditures and
increasing contribution rates.
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The other second-generation reform countries had relatively young and immature
pension systems. Their schemes, too, were based on social insurance principles; originally
established as partially funded schemes, the pension systems' reserves were being drawn
down rapidly due to generous benefit eligibility conditions and high non-pension expen-
diture, as well as high evasion of contributions. The financial pressure, however, was not
yet due to ageing populations. Since the systems covered only a small part of the econom-
ically active population and real benefit levels had deteriorated as a result of inflation, the
cost of these systems was low compared to the Southern Cone countries.
The pension systems in all of the reform countries suffered from a range of common
problems. The distribution of benefits among the population was uneven and inequitable.
The politically powerful groups pressured on policy makers and lobbied for more generous
benefits and eligibility conditions. The urban and rural poor, who had no political power,
were disadvantaged or even excluded from the systems. In most schemes the relation
between benefits and contributions was unsustainable. Benefits had repeatedly been raised
while retirement ages had been lowered. Most schemes had originally been partially funded
with capital reserves to cover expenditures over an actuarially determined period. Arbitrary
benefit increases, cross-subsidization of other social insurance branches, particularly to
finance the infrastructure needs for health care, and politically rather than economically
motivated investments led to a rapid depletion of pension reserves. In addition, the pension
systems suffered from repeated periods of high inflation.
By the end of the 1980s, pension reform had become an urgent and pressing need,
particularly in Argentina and Uruguay. The number of active contributors per pensioner
was declining dramatically. Unemployment and the informalization of the labor force
had increased strongly because of the severe economic crisis and the successive failure of
adjustment attempts during the 1980s. The number of pensioners increased as a result of
generous early retirement and disability regulations. As financial imbalances grew, contri-
bution rates had to be increased; where this proved politically unfeasible, state subsidies
were raised. Fiscal pressures, however, soon made this strategy impossible.
Despite generous legal benefit entitlements, the benefits paid out were very low since
pensions were only partially indexed to inflation. In Chile during the late 1970s, for
example, seventy percent of all pensioners were receiving only the minimum pension. In
Argentina, in 1989, the average pension amounted to only about forty percent of wages
despite a defined benefit of at least seventy percent. Some schemes defaulted on their
pension promises and started to accumulate substantial debt towards the pensioners.
This, in turn, led to even higher evasion of contributions, as workers began to realize that
they might not receive any benefits upon retirement.
Throughout the 1980s, most Latin American countries tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to
reform their retirement systems. Since all proposals to cut pension expenditures or tight-
en eligibility conditions failed, the contribution rates reached unsustainable levels. To
alleviate the burden on employers, several countries tried to replace the employers' share
of contributions by transfers financed out of general tax revenue. However, these mea-
sures were not sufficient to arrest the financial deterioration of the pension systems. As
piecemeal reform failed, the countries started to look for more fundamental solutions to
their problems.
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C. THE APPEAL OF THE CHILEAN PENSION REFORM.
The demonstration effect of the Chilean pension reform promoted a wave of pension
reform in Latin America. As the other countries in the region observed more than a decade
of operations in Chile with an average real rate of return of more than twelve percent and a
rapid accumulation of retirement capital in the new pension system, many governments in
the region took this as an incentive to explore reforms along the same path.
The Chilean pension reform of 1981 was an integral component of an economic and
political restructuring concept elaborated by a group of economists trained predomi-
nantly at the University of Chicago and implemented under the Pinochet military gov-
ernment. Their strategy of structural modernization of the Chilean economy aimed for a
stronger reliance on market mechanisms and private sector participation in the economic
and social sectors. The rationale for the radical transformation of the pension system was
that the public pay-as-you-go system was perceived as having failed for structural reasons
and was thus considered beyond repair. In the second-generation reform countries, the
move towards free-market policies was less pronounced than in Chile, but there was still a
general trend towards more liberalization and less reliance on state intervention through-
out the region at the beginning of the 1990s.
The Chilean model was the first of its kind, not only in Latin America, but world-
wide. It is a defined-contribution scheme in which every worker has an individual retire-
ment account. The pension depends on the amount of contributions and the interest
accrued in the individual account. The pension system is administered by private fund
management companies, the Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFPs), which com-
pete in the market for members. Membership in the AFP system is mandatory for all pri-
vate and public sector employees entering the workforce and optional for the self-
employed. Workers contribute ten percent of their earnings for old age and, on average,
an additional three percent to pay for disability and survivors' insurance as well as the
fund management commissions. Strict regulations for the investment of the funds specify
the allowed financial instruments and maximum investment limits by instrument and
issuer. The retirement age is sixty-five years for men and sixty years for women. At retire-
ment, members have the choice of using their account balance to purchase an annuity
from a life insurance company or to leave the account with the AFP and draw down the
balance according to their individual life expectancy. The government subsidizes the pay-
ment of minimum pensions for members with insufficient balances if they have at least
twenty years of contributions and backs the provision of benefits by the private financial
institutions. Fund managers also must guarantee a minimum profitability, defined as a
band around the average performance of all fund management companies.
The new funded pension systems in Peru, Colombia, and Mexico have incorporated
many features of the Chilean system. The extent of these second-generation reforms,
however, reflects the political difficulties of passing a comprehensive pension reform. This
is true even in the case of Peru where the reform was decreed by an authoritarian govern-
ment. In both Peru and Colombia, the new individual account system was originally
meant to replace the existing public pay-as-you-go scheme as it did in Chile, but, due to
the resistance of trade unions, the social insurance bureaucracy, and other groups, the
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reformers had to accept a compromise: the new schemes are offered only as an alternative
to the existing public pension scheme and there is no obligation for new labor force
entrants to join the private system. Only in Mexico is the new system mandatory for all
private sector workers. Even there, it is still an incomplete reform, given that the public
sector workers keep their old, more generous systems and that the reformers have so far
been unable to transfer the substantial mandatory contribution for the housing fund to
the individual retirement accounts.
In Argentina and Uruguay, the new pension systems are mixed: they have a public
pay-as-you-go component, as well as a privately managed funded pillar. As the pension
systems in both countries were already experiencing severe financial difficulties and con-
tribution rates had increased substantially, a full transition to a funded system was not a
realistic option due to the extremely high costs involved. Further, in both countries the
political power of trade unions and pensioners' associations favoring the preservation of
the pay-as-you-go system is strong. Therefore, a large pay-as-you-go pillar was retained in
the new pension systems.
The Argentine pension reform is more comprehensive and far-reaching than the
Uruguayan reform. Argentina established a true multi-pillar system where all workers
must contribute both to a public pay-as-you-go pillar and to a second pillar that can be
either a privately managed defined-contribution or a public defined-benefit scheme. In
Uruguay, only workers above a certain income threshold are required to contribute to the
second pillar. Since the threshold is set at a relatively high level, few workers are mandato-
rily affiliated; however, the response of workers has been positive and voluntary affiliation
to the new system has been high.
Bolivia chose a completely new approach of combining pension reform with the pri-
vatization and capitalization of state-owned enterprises. The old pay-as-you-go pension
system was closed and all affiliates were automatically transferred to a privately managed,
funded system with individual accounts. At the same time, a universal pension was intro-
duced in which all persons aged twenty-one or older will be entitled once they reach
sixty-five years; it is financed out of a "collective capitalization fund." This fund was creat-
ed during the privatization process: the government sold fifty percent of the public enter-
prises' shares to capitalize the companies and retained the other half for the collective
fund. The fund is managed by the same fund management companies and subject to the
same investment rules as the pension funds thus minimizing the danger of discretionary
investment decisions by the government.
The most recent pension reform was launched in El Salvador. Of all the second-gen-
eration pension reforms, the Salvadoran reform is the one most similar to the Chilean
pension reform. As in Chile, the old pay-as-you-go system is phased out and replaced by a
funded, privately managed system of individual accounts. The Salvadoran pension reform
law was passed in December of 1996, but the new system did not start operations until
April of 1998 due to a crisis in the financial sector and political controversies about the
new system.
The main features of the second-generation pension systems in Latin America are
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III. Funded Individual Retirement Accounts.
A. A MOVEMENT TOWARD.
The Latin American pension reforms entailed two radical changes from previous
pension policies: the move from defined-benefit to defined-contribution plans and the
shift from pay-as-you-go financed to fully or partially funded pension systems. Moving to
a defined-contribution plan means that workers will receive a pension that depends on
their individual contributions, unlike in the old systems where the benefit was defined as
a certain percentage of the workers' previous earnings. The move to funding, on the other
hand, means that every cohort of workers will now save for its own retirement while in a
pay-as-you-go system today's workers pay pension contributions to finance the benefits
for today's pensioners.
Advocates of the new funded pension systems with individual retirement accounts
see the following advantages in such systems: a tight link between contributions and ben-
efits that can reduce distortions in the labor market, a potentially positive impact on
national savings and thereby on economic growth, the mobilization of domestic
resources available for long-term investment that can contribute to capital market devel-
opment, and finally, through the build up of a pool of investable funds, a boost for the
development of the domestic financial sector.
High payroll taxes in pay-as-you-go systems put a wedge between the total cost of
labor payable by the employer and the wage actually received by the worker. This wedge
represents a disincentive for workers to enter into formal sector labor contracts. A contri-
bution for pensions that is paid into an individual account is more likely to be perceived
by workers as personal savings rather than as a tax. In that case, workers would be more
willing to work in the formal sector and forsake part of their wages in order to save for
retirement. Therefore, a defined-contribution system relying on individual accounts may
make labor markets more efficient and reduce distortions.
Funded systems encourage or, if they are mandatory, oblige workers to increase sav-
ings for retirement. It is often argued that pension savings can lead to an increase of
national savings, although the increase in pension wealth may merely displace voluntary
savings. Therefore, there is a great deal of controversy on whether moving to a funded
pension system will actually increase overall national savings. Nevertheless, evidence
exists that funded pension systems can increase national savings under certain circum-
stances, notably when groups that traditionally save only low amounts are required to
participate in funded schemes, when tax incentives related to pensions are limited, and
when borrowing against the accumulated mandatory pension assets is discouraged. 2
Funded pension systems engage in long-term financial contracts. These contracts
may last several decades because they go beyond the active contribution and accumula-
tion phase throughout the retirement phase when beneficiaries are receiving benefits
2. See JEANINE BAILLIU and HELMUT REISEN, Do Funded Pensions Contribute to Higher Aggregate
Savings? A Cross-Country Analysis, (OECD Development Centre Technical Paper No. 130,
1997) available at <http://www.oecd.org/dev/publication/tpla.htm>.
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from the fund. Contrary to other financial institutions, which manage assets that can be
withdrawn anytime, funded pension systems mobilize savings, which are available for
long-term investment in the domestic economy. The management of substantial pension
reserves, particularly if they are managed by private investment companies, requires
financial services such as accounting, securities rating, and investment management.
Through the mobilization of longer-term savings, funded pension systems can, therefore,
stimulate and accelerate the deepening of capital markets and support the establishment
of a modern financial infrastructure.
Thus, the rationale for the introduction of funded, defined-contribution systems in
the second-generation reform countries was a combination of the following factors: (1)
the severe financial crisis, and in some cases bankruptcy, of the existing pay-as-you-go
systems; (2) the impressive performance of the Chilean pension system in terms of real
returns and capital accumulation that led reformers to the conclusion that funded,
defined-contribution schemes were superior to the old systems; (3) a general trend
towards more market oriented economic policies, which favored a radical reform of the
pension system; and (4) a desire on the part of policy makers to mobilize domestic long-
term resources and support the development of the financial sector.
B. TRANSITION TO FUNDING: TRICKY BUT NOT IMPOSSIBLE.
In the transition from pay-as-you-go to a fully or partially funded system, pension
liabilities that are implicit in the old scheme are made explicit. The current workers' con-
tributions can no longer be used for the payment of current pensions, as they must be
accumulated to build retirement capital. At the same time, previous contributions of
workers to the pay-as-you-go scheme have to be honored. Thus, the government has to
come up with a financing mechanism to repay the implicit debt.
Once the general decision for more funding has been taken, pension reform requires
policy decisions at two levels. First, policy makers need to define a transition strategy to
structure the cash flows required for repayment of the implicit pension debt; the transi-
tion strategy determines the depth and speed of reform. Then, the transition cash flows
can be fine-tuned by choosing the appropriate mix of instruments. In most countries,
systemic pension reforms are not launched until the systems are experiencing substantial
financial difficulties. In this situation, contribution rates have usually reached or are
rapidly approaching unsustainable levels and often governments are already subsidizing
the pension systems. Moving towards a more funded system exacerbates the financial
problems in the short to medium term. Most countries therefore need to devise transition
strategies that reduce the costs of transition or at least reduce the annual cash flows to
manageable levels.
A first strategy for transition financing-albeit politically the most difficult-is the
downsizing of the pay-as-you-go systems. A smaller public system will reduce the cost of
transition, particularly if most of the transition workers are affected by the change of
rules. Benefit commitments are downsized by tightening the pension eligibility condi-
tions, such as the retirement age, the minimum years of contributions for access to full
benefits, the rules under which early retirement options may be taken, and by modifying
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the accrual rate for future pensioners. Pensions currently in payment and the benefits of
workers close to retirement are usually not affected; pensioners and older workers should
not be subjected to sudden changes in their retirement income since they are unable to
adjust their financial planning in the short term. Ideally, the downsizing measures should
be taken before the shift to funding is made but, since cutting benefits has proven politi-
cally very difficult, most countries (e.g., Argentina, Uruguay, Peru) have only been able to
downsize the old system simultaneously with the introduction of a new system. If
changes in the benefit structure are combined with cutting entitlements in the old system,
winners and losers of the reform are less easily identified, which lowers 'esistance to sys-
temic reforms.
The second strategy is to reduce the speed of transition. By stretching out the move
from pay-as-you-go to funding over a longer period, the annual financing requirements
can be reduced. This can be achieved by setting limits, for example, cut-off ages, for work-
ers' participation in the new funded system. The most gradual transition to a funded sys-
tem would be to allow only new entrants to the labor force to join the funded system. The
cash flow requirements for the government would then consist initially only in covering
the gap caused by the diversion of the new entrants' contributions. Deficits would
increase gradually as more and more workers retire from the old system. The most radical
transition, on the other hand, would be to close the old system immediately and oblige all
workers to join the new system; Bolivia is the only country where this avenue was chosen.
Countries that have strongly fragmented public pension systems may also decide to
switch only part of the affiliated workers to a new system and postpone the transfer of
other groups to a later date; but in most cases, for example in Mexico, the exclusion of
certain groups of workers is due to political pressures of such groups rather than to finan-
cial considerations.
A third strategy to cope with the problem of transition financing is a partial shift to a
funded system. Partial shifts from pay-as-you-go to funded schemes can take different
forms. One type of partial shift would be to keep a pay-as-you-go financed public pillar
and move only part of the contributions to the funded system. The pay-as-you-go pillar
would continue to pay out current pensions and the government would have to make up
for the share of contributions diverted into the funded pillar. Depending on their bud-
getary constraints, governments could choose to gradually increase the contribution rate
to the funded pillar while lowering the rate for the unfunded pillar until the desired rela-
tion between the two pillars has been reached. Another way of achieving a partial shift
would be to introduce an optional funded system as an alternative to the existing pay-as-
you-go system like in Peru and Colombia; in this case, the speed of the shift depends on
the reaction of workers to the two options. This option, however, provides very little cer-
tainty for governments in terms of their financial planning, particularly if workers are
allowed to switch back and forth between the pay-as-you-go and the funded system.
Once the strategy has been defined, the cash flow requirements of transition can be
fine-tuned by the choice of mechanism to compensate workers for past contributions to
the old system. The largest cash flows would be required in a solution where all the work-
ers switching from the old system would be compensated with immediate lump sum pay-
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ments corresponding to the present value of their acquired rights. If past contributions
are recognized through the issue of bonds that mature at retirement of the individual
worker, the pressure on cash flows is reduced since workers retire gradually, but, since
there are lump sum payments due at retirement, cash flows are still high compared to
using a compensatory pension. Under this solution, past contributions are honored
through the payment of a monthly pension, either from the old system or directly from
the government budget, which supplements the benefit of the new pension system. The
total cost of transition, however, does not depend so much on the instrument used but on
the way the recognized rights are calculated and on the discount rate applied.
The problem of how to compensate workers through the use of different payment
mechanisms needs to be separated from the question of how governments finance the
gap caused by the transition to a funded system. The government's options for financing
the transition are, in principle, the same as for any other kind of public expenditure.
Issuing debt, selling off government assets such as public enterprises, real estate, or other
holdings, raising taxes, and reducing public expenditure in other areas can cover the gap.
Selling off government assets and increasing government debt have the same effect:
in both cases a swap of pension liabilities for government assets takes place. In the first
case, the government loses future returns on the sold assets; in the second case, interest
payments have to be made on debt issued for transition. In both scenarios, future genera-
tions will have to pay for the shift to funding through higher taxes. If the transition is
fully financed by these two instruments, the macroeconomic impact, i.e., the effect on
savings and growth, is equivalent to the situation where the pay-as-you-go system is con-
tinued. Either way, future generations will have to pay more, be it in the form of higher
taxes or higher contributions.
Raising taxes or cutting public expenditure, on the other hand, puts the burden of
transition on the current generations that are living through the transition process. Thus,
the initial income redistribution in favor of the first pensioner generation at the introduc-
tion of the pay-as-you-go system is being undone through this type of transition. The
active generations have to reduce their consumption to pay for the transition. If the
reduced consumption is not compensated through transfers from pensioners to the active
generation, the move to a partially or fully funded pension system will have a positive
effect on savings. Future generations will thus benefit from increased economic growth
and higher income levels.
The second-generation reform countries in Latin America have chosen different ways
of financing the transition to the funded systems depending on the financing require-
ments and the fiscal situation in the individual country. Estimates of the implicit debt of
the old pension systems ranged between more than two hundred percent of GDP in
Uruguay, around ninety percent in Colombia, and around thirty percent in Peru.
In Chile, the government issued recognition bonds to each worker who switched to
the new system. These bonds are calculated to correspond to the present value of a pen-
sion, replacing eighty percent of earnings for a full contribution period; they are adjusted
for inflation and carry a real rate of return of four percent annually. The bonds are calcu-
lated at the moment of transfer and mature at retirement of the eligible member. The
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resulting sum is placed into the individual account. Current and future pensions for
members who chose to remain in the public system are financed from current contribu-
tions to the public scheme and from general budget subsidies.
The same approach is being used in Colombia, Peru, and El Salvador, although past
contributions are recognized less generously. Argentina chose instead to use a compen-
satory pension payment for the recognition of past contributions to the old system. This
benefit is paid out by the public pay-as-you-go pillar, and it is financed out of current
contributions and budgetary transfers for which certain taxes have been earmarked. This
mechanism reflects Argentina's limited capacity for additional public debt on the one
hand and the high implicit debt of the system on the other hand. By paying out a month-
ly pension instead of redeeming a recognition bond at the moment of retirement, the
financial burden is stretched out over a longer period reducing cash flow pressures for the
government. Bolivia also decided to offer a compensatory pension to workers affiliated in
the old system.
Uruguay has no explicit compensation for acquired rights but continues to pay all
old benefit entitlements through the public pillar. The public system will continue to pro-
vide the bulk of pension benefits anyway since the second pillar is very limited in size and
scope. Mexico decided to offer no compensation for acquired rights at all but to give all
workers a "lifetime switch" option. Workers nearing retirement are allowed to compare
their benefit entitlements under the new and the old system and to then choose the more
advantageous option. If they opt for the public benefit, the balance accumulated in the
individual account must be turned over to the public system.
Transition financing in Chile was facilitated by the strict budgetary policies of the
government during the early 1980s. The recognition bonds were issued between 1981 and
1984. In 1981, when the reform was introduced, the government was running an overall
budget surplus. From 1982 to 1984, an overall budget deficit was registered due to the
severe economic crisis and due to a strong increase of social assistance pensions. If all
pension expenditures are excluded from the budget, however, a surplus persists through-
out the 1980s and early 1990s. These observations, however, do not imply that one can
identify the financial resources used for the financing of the transition.
The Chilean economy has been undergoing profound structural changes during the
last decades, including tax and trade reforms, privatization, and labor market and finan-
cial sector reforms. Not only pension reform but also numerous other factors have had an
impact on the government budget. Therefore, it is impossible to say from which specific
source-budget surpluses, taxes, or government debt-the transition deficit was and is
being financed. The same holds true for most of the second-generation reform countries
where pension reform was launched at the same time as other important structural
reforms that had an impact on the fiscal situation of the countries. Similarly, using com-
pensatory pensions instead of recognition bonds gives no indication of the source of
financing since the government can issue debt to obtain the revenue necessary for trans-
fers to the pension institution, but it is safe to conclude that the favorable fiscal situation
made transition financing much easier for the Chilean government than it is for the sec-
ond-generation reform countries, none of which is in a similarly good fiscal position.
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The fiscal requirements and future cash flows resulting from pension reform are difficult
to estimate in most of the second-generation reform countries. In Colombia, for example,
cost projections are complicated by the fact that affiliates may switch between the new and
the old system. In most second-generation reform countries, affiliation in the new systems is
not mandatory for new workers, and it is difficult to estimate what affiliation rates and thus
contribution volumes in the future will be. In Argentina, future costs are also unclear, since
the government passed an emergency law in which it commits itself to pay only what it can
afford. In Mexico, where the lifetime switch option is offered, the fiscal costs will not become
clear until the workers with acquired rights reach retirement age.
IV. Reform Critique.
A. REFORM RESULTS: EARLY EVIDENCE.
The acceptance of the new private systems has been high, particularly among
younger age groups. Workers under thirty-five years of age account for about seventy per-
cent of all affiliates in Peru, almost eighty percent in Colombia, and about half of all affili-
ates in Argentina. The income distribution of the affiliates in the new systems reflects the
general levels of earnings in the respective countries. In Colombia, almost eighty percent
of affiliates earn less than two minimum wages. In 1997, the average salary of Colombian
workers contributing to the private system was $358, compared to $608 in Chile and $905
in Argentina.
The introduction of the new funded systems has led to a rapid build up of retirement
capital. The Chilean pension system has accumulated more than $30 billion correspond-
ing to about forty percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In the second-generation
reform countries, the largest fund has been accumulated by the Argentine pension sys-
tem, which has now reached 3.2 percent of GDP. Compared to the evolution of the
Chilean system, which after three years already amounted to 8.6 percent of GDP, growth
has been much slower in Argentina. This is mostly due to the fact that in Argentina only
about 7.7 percent of wages are being saved in the individual account while in Chile, ten
percent of wages are being saved. Also, all Argentine workers, including new entrants to
the labor force, are still given the option of contributing to the public second pillar where
capital is accumulated. In Colombia and Peru, contribution rates were also lower during
the first years, but the coverage of the system is also much lower, which explains why the
pension funds' assets make up only around two percent of GDP.
The new systems have enjoyed high real rates of return. Despite the recent downturn
and a record low of -6.3 percent real return in the period between July of 1997 and 1998,
the Chilean system still boasts an average real return of more than eleven percent over the
last seventeen years. In the second-generation reform countries, returns should be
assessed taking into account the relatively short period of operations. Also, the returns in
all Latin American countries reflect the high-risk premiums in emerging markets. To
date, the highest real rate of return has been achieved in Argentina, on average almost
thirteen percent; again, this result reflects the high level of interest rates in Argentina
more than specific investment strategies of the Argentine pension fund managers.
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In all of the reform countries, the differences between the portfolios of the individual
Administradores de Fondos de Pensiones (AFPs) are small. The reasons for the fund man-
agers' similar investment choices may be due to several factors, including the direct and
indirect regulatory restrictions on investment and the still limited availability of invest-
ment instruments in incipient capital markets. Another factor that may influence the
herding behavior of the pension fund managers is the minimum rate of return rule with
which the managers have to comply.
Investment in foreign securities has been either negligible or disallowed during the
start-up of the systems. Even in Chile, where more than ten percent of assets may now be
invested abroad, the share of foreign securities in the portfolio has always remained below
four percent. There are several reasons for this "home bias," i.e., the preference of pension
managers to invest in domestic assets. Investment overseas involves higher transaction
costs and foreign exchange risk. For pension managers, the shortfall risk is often more
important than the upside potential. Managers may also be limited by internal restric-
tions on foreign investment imposed by the shareholders of the pension fund manage-
ment companies. Particularly in developing economies, fund managers may not be suffi-
ciently familiar with foreign markets and tax laws in other countries and would have to
conduct extensive research to collect the necessary information. Fund management com-
panies would need to hire a specialized team of experts to manage their overseas invest-
ment activities.
In the Latin American reform countries where the majority of fund management
companies have still not broken even, managers are hesitating to incur these additional
expenses, particularly since high returns can be obtained in the emerging domestic mar-
kets. Under these circumstances, pension fund managers find it unprofitable to invest
pension fund assets overseas. This view is shortsighted, however, since international
diversification would lower risk substantially.3 Especially in small countries with under-
developed capital markets, private pension systems will not function without internation-
al diversification. Otherwise, capital would not only be concentrated in very few instru-
ments with highly correlated risks but also concentrated in too few companies or con-
glomerates.
The introduction of private pension funds has supported the development of the
financial sector, particularly in countries with an underdeveloped financial and regulatory
infrastructure. The Latin American reform experience illustrates how systemic pension
reforms can spill over to other areas of the financial sector. In most of the reform coun-
tries, the regulatory framework of the securities and insurance markets was overhauled
simultaneously with pension reform, and proyiders of financial services are now required
to disclose information according to international standards. The financial data required
by the supervisors in Latin America is accessible to the public; fund unit values, rates of
return, and other data is published daily in the major newspapers. The continuous moni-
toring of financial indicators by supervisors, analysts, and specialized information ser-
3. See HELMUT REISEN, Liberalising Foreign Investments by Pension Funds: Positive and Normative
Aspects, (OECD Development Centre Technical Paper No. 120, 1997) available at
<http://www.oecd.org/dev/publication/tp I a.htm>.
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vices facilitates the establishment of early warning systems. The development of reliable
public information systems can help to build confidence and trust in the financial sector
among the population and, thus, contribute to the reduction of volatility.
B. RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ONLY FOR A FEW?
A major criticism of the new defined-contribution systems centers on their capacity
to provide adequate old age income given that many workers do not contribute regularly
to their accounts and may find themselves with very low balances at the moment of
retirement. In a defined-benefit system that guarantees a certain replacement rate, the risk
of interrupted careers or periods of low earnings is pooled among all members of the
scheme while these risks are individualized in defined-contribution systems. However, in
defined-benefit systems where there is a close link between contributions and benefits,
the same problem arises if workers do not contribute regularly.
First of all, the informal sector is large in most Latin American countries, particularly
in the poorer countries such as Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia, which limits the coverage
and effectiveness of pension systems tied to formal sector employment. In all of the pri-
vate pension systems in Latin America, a large discrepancy between the number of affili-
ates, i.e., account holders, and the number of active contributors can be observed. In
Argentina and Chile, the ratio of contributors and affiliates has been fluctuating around
fifty percent; in Peru, about forty-four percent of all affiliates contribute regularly to their
accounts; this is the lowest ratio in Latin America.
There are various reasons for this discrepancy. In the case of dependent workers,
employers may default on their payment obligations; often, mistakes are made in the con-
tribution data submitted to the fund management companies or in the payment of con-
tributions. Some of the evasion is simply due to the fact that workers leave the labor mar-
ket to pursue further studies, stay at home, or start up their own business, in which case
they are no longer obliged to contribute, except in Argentina where the self-employed
must also contribute. Independent workers often stop contributing due to the instability
of their incomes, other priorities in the allocation of their savings, or misunderstanding
of the benefits and mechanics of the system.
In Chile, the AFPs' association claims that ninety-seven percent of all workers
required to contribute to the overall pension system were actually complying with this
obligation in 1996. A calculation 4 shows that out of the total Chilean labor force of
5.3 million, 3.3 million workers were in dependent employment and below the age of
sixty-five years. The number of active contributors below the age of sixty-five in the pri-
vate system, the public system contributors, and the contributing members of the special
retirement schemes added up to 3.2 million, i.e., ninety-seven percent of the dependent
employees under sixty-five years. Thus, the problem of effective pension coverage in Chile
appears to be more a problem of affiliating self-employed workers than ensuring contri-
bution compliance of dependent workers. Currently, only about twenty percent of all self-
employed are affiliated to the pension system.
4. SeeAsocIACION DE ADMINISTRADORAS DE FONDOS DE PENSIONES DE CHILE, EL SISTEMA PRIVADO DE
PENSIONES CHILENO (1996).
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In Argentina, affiliation to the overall pension system, i.e., in the first pillar and the
two second pillar options, increased substantially after the pension reform. Nevertheless,
noncontributing affiliates are still a problem in the private system where the ratio has
dropped from sixty-two percent initially to forty-nine percent at the end of 1997. It
should be taken into account though that the Argentine economy underwent a severe
recession in 1995, during which unemployment rates increased strongly; this may explain
a large part of the ratio's decline.
The increasing share of noncontributing affiliates jeopardizes the effectiveness of the
new pension systems in providing old age income security. It is mostly among lower
income groups that the share of noncontributing members is highest; in most countries,
pension fund management companies with higher average base salaries have much higher
shares of contributing members. In those countries that provide a minimum pension
guarantee, the high shares of noncontributing members will translate into an increased
need for fiscal subsidies to attain the minimum benefit level. In addition, many affiliates
might not even complete the necessary contribution period in order to receive the mini-
mum pension, particularly in countries like Argentina and Uruguay where the required
contribution periods are very long. In that case, the noncontributory old age assistance
programs would require additional budgetary resources.
C. PRIVATE PENSIONS: BETTER AND CHEAPER?
Introducing a market-based solution for the provision of pensions with competitive
management was intended to produce better and cheaper pensions than the old publicly
administered systems. Has this objective been met?
Given that the public pay-as-you-go systems in Latin America functioned badly and
paid low benefits to the majority of workers, any comparison between the old and the
new systems would, for the time being at least, give results in favor of the private systems.
In the second-generation reform countries, the number of pensioners retiring from the
new systems is still very low. In Chile, where more and more workers are beginning to
receive benefits from the new systems, the benefit levels are on average substantially high-
er than in the old system. It should be taken into account, however, that workers retiring
from the new system today have benefited from the generously calculated recognition
bond. Therefore, the pension level can be only partially attributed to the performance of
the new system.
While it still remains to be seen whether the new systems will provide "better" pen-
sions in the future, it is clear that presently the provision of benefits is not cheap. The
operating costs of the new systems are very high. In systems that rely on individual retire-
ment savings, high administrative costs endanger effective old age protection by cutting
into the retirement capital. Workers in the Latin American reform countries are charged
up to 3.5 percent of their base salaries to cover disability and survivors' insurance as well
as the administrative costs of the systems. Despite falling insurance costs, the total charge
to workers has remained fairly constant. As insurance premiums have declined, the share
dedicated to covering the AFPs' operating costs has increased from about one percent to
almost three percent of wages in some countries. Depending on the contribution rates in
Autumn 1999 559
the individual countries, administrative costs thus correspond to between twenty and
thirty percent of contributions.
In the second-generation reform countries, the pension fund management compa-
nies are still struggling to amortize the very high start-up expenditures of the new sys-
tems. To launch the system, the companies employed large numbers of sales agents,
engaged in expensive advertising campaigns, and invested heavily in computer equipment
and other office infrastructure. Thus, the current cost structure and financial perfor-
mance of all the newer systems still reflects the start-up expenditures. In the medium to
longer term, the operating costs of the pension fund management companies should
decline substantially. As the companies enlist more affiliates and accumulate larger vol-
umes of assets under management, they should be able to benefit from economies of
scale, which should translate into lower costs to workers. The Chilean system, however,
which has been in operation for seventeen years, does not present any evidence of
decreasing costs to workers, while still less than half of the companies are profitable.
The main reason for the high operating costs in the private systems is related to the
transfers of members' accounts between the different fund management companies. All sec-
ond-generation reform countries have adopted the principle of free choice between man-
agement companies, which is one of the central features of the Chilean pension model.
Workers, however, do not seem to choose their fund managers on the basis of fee levels or
rate of return differences. Instead, they choose their managers because of advertising cam-
paigns, promotional gifts, and cash payments, because of advice they receive from their peer
groups, or even just to do agents a favor. As the agents are paid their commissions per affili-
ate, they have a strong incentive to switch as many affiliates as often as possible.
The fund management companies employ large numbers of selling agents and spend
substantial sums on advertising. This has led to "transfer wars" between the different compa-
nies. The problem is compounded by the fact that the fund management companies display
very similar investment behavior both with respect to the classes of instruments and the
individual security issues. Switching large numbers of workers around between fund man-
agement companies with practically identical portfolios is obviously highly inefficient. In
Chile, fifty percent of all contributors switch AFPs each year; in Argentina, about thirty per-
cent of all contributors change fund managers. Competition between the fund management
companies was meant to provide the highest quality of services at the lowest prices for work-
ers. Instead, the mechanism has produced cutthroat competition among companies for the
individual accounts and high prices for all workers.
Several proposals have been made regarding how to lower marketing costs. Some
countries have chosen to limit the number of transfers allowed annually. In Mexico, for
example, workers will only be allowed to switch once per year. Other proposals suggest
allowing more than one account per worker, which would reduce the competition for
accounts, or to allow multiple providers of pension fund management services (banks,
insurance companies, other financial institutions) instead of segmenting the market by
permitting only single purpose companies to conduct the business. This, it is argued,
would lead to lower fees because there would be much greater competition among
providers. It is questionable, however, whether this approach could work in countries
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with incipient capital markets and a limited number of well-developed, sound financial
institutions to compete with the pension funds. Furthermore, segregation of the manda-
tory pension savings from both the business capital and all other types of investment
funds, which is a crucial element in the Chilean-style pension systems, would be difficult
to achieve and even more difficult to supervise.
Other reform suggestions address the type and level of the administrative fees direct-
ly. Some countries allow both collection-based and asset-based management fees. Clearly,
in the start-up phase of pension funds when workers' balances are slowly beginning to
build up, collection-based fees are more advantageous for the pension fund management
companies than asset-based management fees, which would be much cheaper for workers
in the beginning, but more expensive in the long run. At the end of a worker's career,
however, collection-based fees will be very low when expressed as a percentage of assets.
One possibility to reduce the level of commissions would be to let employers negoti-
ate group affiliation with AFPs at a lower fee. Another option would be to allow AFPs to
differentiate the fees among affiliates instead of mandating the same price for all; that
way, AFPs could offer loyalty discounts to workers who stay with the same AFP for a
longer period of time.
Finally, although there is no doubt that the costs of the new pension systems are
high, there still remains the problem of finding the adequate comparator. Should the
costs and efficiency of the private pension funds be compared to those of the old public
pay-as-you-go systems, to publicly managed funded systems such as the complementary
funded pension system in Sweden and the Provident Funds in Singapore and Malaysia, or
to similar non-bank financial institutions such as mutual funds? Often, cost comparisons
are made between pension and mutual funds. Here, however, the relevant comparators
are not U.S. mutual funds that offer a wide variety of choices at low costs. Rather, com-
parisons should be made with Latin American mutual funds. The fees charged by Latin
American mutual funds are currently still very high; Chilean mutual funds, for example,
in 1997 charged retail investors more than five percent of assets as fees for equity funds
and around 2.5 percent for fixed income funds.
Comparing systems across countries, one could argue that for workers the cost of the
private pension systems in Latin America is still lower than that of the above mentioned
publicly managed funded pension systems such as the Southeast Asian Provident Funds.
These publicly managed schemes are more expensive because the governments grant work-
ers much lower rates of return than they would receive on bank deposits and investments in
diversified portfolios; in Singapore, for example, workers are credited the average interest
rate on bank deposits regardless of what returns the government gets on the investment of
the provident fund's assets. Taking this implicit tax into account, Chilean commissions are
substantially lower than the costs that Southeast Asian workers have to shoulder.
What matters to workers is the net return on their balances. As long as the pension sys-
tems are able to reach real rates of return as high as those observed in Chile, workers can
indeed "afford" to spend considerable amounts of money on the administration of the
schemes, but as soon as the real rates of return start to fall, the net returns will be reduced
substantially. This will jeopardize the accumulation of retirement capital in the workers' indi-
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vidual accounts. Therefore, the problem of high operating costs will need to be addressed in
a more comprehensive way even if the net returns of the systems are currently high.
In this respect, the experience of the new Bolivian system will be interesting to
observe. The two successful bidders were selected on the basis of the fees they will charge
to workers. The fees proposed by the two companies are the lowest in Latin America and
correspond to about one percent of the base salary, i.e., between a half and a third of what
pension fund managers charge in the other Latin American countries. If the companies
succeed in operating profitably at such fee levels, a similar bidding approach could be
taken in other countries as well.
D. DRAWING DOWN THE BALANCE: THE PROBLEM OF ANNUITIES.
The new pension systems of the second-generation reform countries are currently all
in the accumulation phase. The workers affiliated with the defined-contribution systems
are predominantly young and the number of old age pensioners is still very small.
Therefore, the problem of how to draw down the balance accumulated in the individual
account has not yet become an issue in the countries with recently reformed pension sys-
tems. In Chile, the number of pensioners in the private pension system is rapidly increas-
ing. Most of the pensioners, however, have not reached the official retirement age yet but
have accumulated sufficient balances in their individual accounts in order to retire early.
About seventy percent of the annuities paid in 1996 were due to early retirement.
Retiring workers have different benefit options. The first option is a gradual with-
drawal of the accumulated balance. The fund management company determines a
monthly pension that is recalculated annually. The annual benefit is calculated on the
basis of the capital available in the account and the cohort-specific "necessary capital" to
provide an income stream until death; the "necessary capital" is determined on the basis
of actuarial tables and regulated by the pension superintendency. As the balance is being
drawn down, the remainder of the pensioner's account stays with the fund manager and
is invested in the same way as the active accounts. This option does not guarantee a life-
long income. A pensioner who outlives the life expectancy of his cohort may eventually
receive only the minimum pension or even nothing at all if he or she contributed for less
than twenty years.
Choosing this programmed withdrawal option, however, does offer three advantages.
First, in case of a pensioner's death, the remaining balance can be passed on to the sur-
vivors. Second, pensioners are allowed to withdraw a lump sum equivalent to the excess
capital over the amount that is necessary to finance a pension corresponding to seventy
percent of previous earnings. Third, pensioners can change fund managers if they are not
satisfied with the services. Currently, there are no fees charged for the programmed with-
drawal, which means in effect that the active contributors are subsidizing pensioners.
Since many pensioners wish to protect themselves against the risk of insufficient retire-
ment income, however, an increasing number of pensioners are choosing a second
option: the purchase of an annuity from a private insurance company.
The purchase of an annuity is only open to pensioners who have enough funds in
their balances to finance a benefit greater than the minimum pension. The annuity can be
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immediate, i.e., commence with retirement, or deferred, in which case pensioners initially
use the programmed withdrawal option and move to an annuity later. According to life
insurance industry estimates, about sixty percent of all Chilean pensioners choose the
annuity option. The volume of annuity premiums in Chile soared from $51 million in
1987 to an estimated $1.1 billion at the end of 1996. The number of life insurance com-
panies in Chile has increased from nine in 1988, the year in which early retirement was
authorized, to more than twenty at present.
The annuity option brings with it the problems of annuity markets arising not only
in Latin America but also in all countries around the world. The main problem of annu-
ities is adverse selection: only people who expect to live for a long time, i.e., bad risks
from the point of view of an insurance company, will be interested in purchasing an
annuity contract. Due to this adverse selection and the fact that insurance companies
cannot be sure that mortality tables correctly reflect life expectancy, risk premiums are
high and annuity contracts will not be sold at an actuarially fair price to good risks, i.e.,
pensioners who are expected to die soon.
Depending on the type of annuity contract, a pensioner is exposed to several risks. In
a fixed annuity contract, the insurance company commits itself to paying a fixed, usually
nominal pension until the pensioner dies. Thus, while the insurance company assumes
the demographic and the investment risk, the pensioner is exposed to the risk of infla-
tion, unless the annuity is contracted in real terms, i.e., indexed to inflation. Annuities
with inflation protection need adequate investment instruments to back the indexation,
i.e., usually CPI-indexed government securities. Very few countries have wide-ranging
financial sector indexation, such as that to be found in Chile, so that there are not many
private sector issues that are indexed to inflation. Even CPI-indexed government bonds
are currently only available in a small number of countries: the UK, Canada, Finland,
Israel, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and, more recently, in the United States.
Under a variable annuity contract, the pensioner uses the accumulated balance to
purchase units in a mutual fund; the monthly pension is defined as a number of units
and varies depending on the unit value. Premiums are usually invested in a portfolio of
stocks but could also be invested in bond or money market funds. The pensioner assumes
the investment risk while the insurance company assumes the demographic risk. If the
units are adjusted to inflation, the pensioner is protected against price increases; if not,
the pensioner also has to bear the inflation risk.
In Chile, annuities, like practically all financial contracts, are expressed in Unidades
de Fomento (UF), which are accounting units adjusted monthly to inflation. Currently, all
annuities are fixed and indexed to the CPI. The annuity is purchased with the payment of
a single premium at the beginning of the contract. The contract is irrevocable, the annui-
tant is not permitted to switch insurance companies, and it is not possible to adjust the
annuities later. Since the annuity is contracted with a single premium payment, the annu-
ity is highly dependent on the value of the balance at the moment of purchase, particular-
ly if the portfolio contains a high proportion of equity. In order to avoid strong fluctua-
tions and expose workers close to retirement to the risk of low balance value and thus
below average annuities, the Chilean regulators are considering making gradual pre-
retirement conversion to fixed-income securities mandatory.
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Annuity intermediation costs in Chile have increased from 1.5 percent of the gross pre-
mium in 1988 to more than five percent today. These costs include the marketing and
administrative fees of the insurance companies as well as the commissions to brokers. An
important factor for the high costs is the fact that all annuities are contracted on an individ-
ual basis and group contracts are not allowed. Instead, every pensioner has to negotiate inde-
pendently with the insurance companies. The annuitant is required to provide the pension
authorities with three different quotations for annuity provision. Partly, the high costs of
annuities are also due to information problems. Life insurance companies that are part of a
group with a related fund management company are in a position to charge commissions
that are lower by about 100 basis points than the companies that are not related to any fund
manager. There appears to be evidence that the companies' employees are selling informa-
tion on potential annuitants to life insurance companies; a law has been proposed to publi-
cize this information and thus make it available to all insurance companies.
Several suggestions have been proposed about how to lower the cost of annuities.
One way would be to allow group annuities rather than limiting the option to individual
annuities. If annuities could be contracted for a whole group of affiliates similar to the
purchase of disability and survivors' insurance, which is contracted for all affiliates of a
fund management company, the costs could be expected to decline considerably. To
reduce the adverse selection and thereby lower the premium, the government could also
decide to make annuities mandatory, since insurance companies will then charge a price
based on the average of all annuitants and not only the ones who expect to live for a long
time. In this respect, the Uruguayan pension reform has introduced an interesting inno-
vation: pensioners affiliated with the private system will not be able to choose a pro-
grammed withdrawal; instead, the purchase of an annuity contract will be mandatory.
V. What Can the Rest of the World Learn from Latin America?
In OECD countries, the problems of social security are primarily due to the demo-
graphic transition; in recent years, high structural unemployment has aggravated the situ-
ation in Western European countries. The pension systems in Latin America confronted
crisis much earlier than would be expected judging by their demographic dependency
ratios. Some of the reasons for the financial imbalance of the Latin American social secu-
rity systems are different from those in OECD countries. Evasion, for example, has as yet
been much less of a problem in most OECD countries; the management of the pension
institutions is usually quite efficient and administrative costs of pension systems are
much lower. The effects of the financial crisis, however, are the same: rising contribution
rates resulting in unsustainable levels of payroll taxes, increasing government subsidies to
stabilize the systems, and gradual reductions of benefit levels.
In the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe, pension reform has
become a pressing issue as real benefit levels have plummeted and pension systems have
become financially unsustainable. Two countries, Hungary and Poland, have already
adopted pension systems that incorporate many features of the Latin American models,
and in several other countries of the region pension reform along the same lines is being
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discussed. The early experience of the Latin American reforms is, therefore, particularly
relevant for these countries in order to benefit from the positive experiences and avoid
the mistakes that have been made in the process.
Most developing countries in Asia have more time to consider their options in pen-
sion reform, since their systems still have a favorable ratio of contributors to pensioners
and are not experiencing financial imbalances yet; China is an exception as the one-child
policy will lead to much more rapid process of ageing than that experienced by OECD
countries. Nevertheless, the social protection of the older population has become urgent
in the wake of the financial crisis and has put pension reform on the agenda. For Asian
countries, the Latin American experience is also interesting with respect to financial sec-
tor stabilization as the reforms have shown that pension funds can support and strength-
en the development of the financial sector.
A. THE SECOND-GENERATION PENSION REFORMS IN LATIN AMERICA SHOW THAT A PARTIAL
TRANSITION TO FUNDING IS FEASIBLE.
The second-generation reforms in Latin America have demonstrated that structural
pension reform is possible under very different economic, political, and social conditions.
Up to the late 1980s, the Chilean pension model was still regarded as too closely connect-
ed to the authoritarian Pinochet government and thus impossible to implement in a
democratic context. The Chilean example has attracted a lot of attention and its perceived
success has reduced the resistance to reform among political interest groups in other
Latin American countries. Partially funded solutions similar to the new pension model
established in Argentina are now being adopted in modified forms even in Eastern
Europe (Hungary, Poland).
For OECD countries, the reform experience of Argentina and Uruguay is particularly
relevant. First, the old age dependency ratios and system dependency ratios in Argentina
and Uruguay are very similar to those found in Western Europe and Japan; in Argentina,
for example, in 1996 there were only 1.5 contributors per pensioner and 3.1 persons of
working age per person above sixty years. Second, both countries had pension systems
modeled on Western European social insurance schemes with high benefit levels, high
contribution rates, and state transfers to finance growing deficits. Thus, policy makers
were faced with a scenario that resembles the crisis of the welfare state in high-income
OECD countries. Third, neither country adopted a pure capitalization scheme such as the
Chilean model. Instead, they introduced mixed models maintaining a reformed version of
their public pay-as-you-go systems combined with a privately managed funded pillar.
B. THE TRANSITION TO A FULLY OR PARTIALLY FUNDED PENSION SYSTEM CAN BE FINANCED
IN DIFFERENT WAYS.
Particularly in OECD countries, it is often argued that a transition to a partially or
fully funded pension scheme is impossible because current generations would have to pay
twice-for the pensions of today's retirees and for their own future retirement. The sec-
ond-generation reforms show that this is not the case. The reforms demonstrate that gov-
ernments have a considerable degree of freedom in the design of the financial transition
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path and that there are choices in distributing the fiscal burden of reform. The instru-
ments used to cover the financing gap are crucial as well as the parameters set in the
reforms such as the cut-off age for eligible workers, the integration or exclusion of certain
occupational groups who have special, more generous pension regimes, and the calcula-
tion and recognition of rights acquired under the old system. Further, pre-reform mea-
sures streamlining the existing pension programs by increasing the retirement age, scaling
down benefit entitlements, and tightening eligibility conditions for old age and disability
pensions were an important factor for cost reduction in all of the reform countries.
The second-generation reforms also show the distributional effects of postponing
reform over a long period. In Latin America, the pensioners carried a large part of the
transition burden in the years prior to reform. Piecemeal reforms and arbitrary benefit
reductions, particularly through insufficient indexation, led to very low pension levels.
The reforms are carried out on the basis of these low pension levels. While transition and
future generations are likely to benefit from much higher pension levels, the current pen-
sioners will see little, if any, improvement in their payments.
C. OTHER COUNTRIES SHOULD CAREFULLY CONSIDER THE APPROPRIATE STRUCTURE OF THE
FUNDED PILLAR GIVEN THE HIGH ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS OF THE LATIN AMERICAN MODELS.
The individual account management by specialized fund management firms has proven
to be very costly, and the competition among firms has led to an excessive switching of
accounts. Some modifications of the rules and regulations for the fund management indus-
try are currently being discussed in Latin America. Such changes may or may not be success-
ful in lowering the costs to workers. For OECD countries considering the introduction of a
mandatory second pillar, these experiences are useful when deciding on which providers to
allow. Given that many OECD countries already have established employer-based second pil-
lars, the Latin American model may not be the most suitable approach.
An alternative for the management of a compulsory second pillar could be the
employer-based second pillar similar to the one in Switzerland where plan sponsors have
a choice of in-house management, banks, or insurance companies for the management of
the pension plan. Another option would be a public, centralized institution or the estab-
lishment of a fund under the umbrella of the existing social security institution with pri-
vate asset management through competing investment managers. Under such a model,
the public institution would be able to negotiate asset management fees for all affiliates,
and workers could still be given a choice between different investment portfolios depend-
ing on individual risk preferences. This option is currently being explored in the manage-
ment of the Southeast Asian provident funds. The second-pillar solutions in OECD coun-
tries are likely to be much more diverse and shaped to individual country conditions than
in Latin America where the funded pillars were built from scratch without any preexisting
structures to build on.
D. SUCCESSFUL PENSION REFORM REQUIRES CONSISTENCY AND CONSENSUS.
The experience of Chile and the second-generation reform countries shows that the
consistency of the pension reform concept was crucial to bringing reform about and
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implementing the adopted strategy. Consistency refers both to the internal consistency of
the chosen model and to consistency with the overall economic and social policy frame-
work in the individual country. This can be seen in such diverse cases as in Chile, where
pension reform was an integral component of the economic and political restructuring
concept elaborated by a group of neoliberal economists, in Colombia, where pension
reform was part of a larger reform concept and was preceded by external liberalization
and reform of the labor code, and in Bolivia, where pension reform was integrated into
the privatization policy of the government. The absence of consistency was the reason for
the near failure of the Peruvian reform, which made it necessary to re-launch the private
system after the design flaws had been corrected.
The importance of building consensus can be seen in the quality of the political dis-
course in Latin America in the early 1990s. The overriding objective of pension reforms,
regardless of the model proposed, must be the improvement of retirement income securi-
ty; this should be kept in focus in the political debate. All other effects of pension reforms
on capital markets, financial sector infrastructure, or privatization, however beneficial
they may be, are subordinated objectives of pension reform. A policy measure that has a
positive impact on any of these other areas but fails to improve the provision of pensions
should not be given the label of pension reform. Much confusion and unnecessary con-
frontation has arisen in the political arena because the primary aim of reform-to pro-
vide better and sustainable old age benefits-has not been spelled out clearly.
E. FOR OECD AND TRANSITION COUNTRIES IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO ARREST THE
FINANCIAL DETERIORATION OF PENSION SYSTEMS NOW INSTEAD OF WAITING FOR THESE
SYSTEMS TO COLLAPSE.
Although reform may be easier when the financial problems are more obvious to the
electorate and to the interest groups, measures have to be taken now. The longer reform is
postponed, the more expensive the transition to a new system becomes. The history of
failed reform attempts in Argentina and Uruguay shows that the political resistance to
pension reform can stop all measures to restore financial equilibrium of the system until
the situation has deteriorated so much that no interest group can gain any advantage. The
financial collapse of the pension system paved the way for systemil reform. Benefit cuts,
increases in the retirement age, and tightening of eligibility conditions, which had been
impossible in earlier years, were now accepted. Partly, political acceptance was facilitated
by the introduction of a completely new system that departed radically from the old
structure and seemed more credible in its promise of new and better benefits. Further, it
had become clear to the electorate and to policy makers that piecemeal reforms would
not be sufficient to put the pension system back on track. The losers in this process are
clearly current pensioners whose real benefit levels deteriorated dramatically before the
reform and who have little chance of expecting any improvements during the transition
process as additional financing requirements are imposed on the government.
